Not a Good Week for the JSF

Click for full size

---

The Problem: As development times of microprocessors and cars have remained steady or fallen, fighter development times have exploded.

The GAO has released its report on the JSF, and the nickel tour, as described by Bill Sweetman, is rather brutal:

The good news for the JSF program in the March 20 Government Accountability Office report – combined with the other numbers released in March – is that the program is no longer at risk of failure.

The bad news is that it has already failed.

(emphasis mine)

It's true.

The $50 million (2002 dollars) affordable aircraft is now a $106+ million ($127+ million for the B & C versions, 2010 dollars) aircraft, and there are still significant technical hurdles to its success:

• There is no money to pay for the alternate engine (F136).
• The current engine, the F135 has deep and real cost and performance issues.
• The term for these first two items is "Catch 22": You cannot afford a alternate engine, and not having an alternate engine means that you lack a lever to force the contractor to address issues with cost and reliability.
• Cost reduction efforts have under performed.
• There are indications that there is significant price elasticity of demand for foreign customers, which means that they will purchase fewer, or cancel contracts, as costs increase, which will further increase unit cost. (See the Danes, below)
• Direct operating costs are slightly more than the F-15, and significantly more than the F-16 which it is tasked to replace.

DARPA has looked at this, and concluded that the system engineering techniques used in aerospace are largely responsible for the program, because they take the top level requirements and "stovepipe" them down the chain, where they remain isolated until they eventually come together in something that resembles a multi-car pileup

In any case, one of the consequences of the cost and schedule slippage has been that the Danish government has decided to delay any decision on purchasing the F-35.

I see this as a prelude to cancellation: If they aren't ready to buy the $106 million dollar aircraft now, they won't be willing to buy the $126 million dollar aircraft in 4 years. (link to Google translation of the report)

Basically, once you commit to a purchase, it's very tough to pull out, even when the cost escalates, but if you defer the decision, and the cost escalates, it's a no brainer to stay out of the program.

The program appears to be in a death spiral, where increasing unit costs reduce purchases, which increases unit costs, etc., or to quote The Boss, "It's a death trap, it's a suicide rap."